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Abstract 
This paper addresses the issues of current levels of inequality: their trends, determinants and future 
scenarios, demonstrating that welfare levels are measured by per capita consumption. Location, 
educational attainment and employment status have been identified as the key factors affecting levels 
of welfare and its distribution. A benefit incidence analysis was performed to investigate benefits of 
different deciles of per capita expenditure from education and health services. The inequality patterns 
in countries under investigation present significant variations; countries such as Turkey, Morocco and 
Tunisia show relatively high inequality while others, such as Egypt or Syria, show moderate to low 
inequality. Inequality in human development was addressed using the inequality-adjusted human 
development index (IHDI), introduced by Global HDR 2010. The average loss in the HDI due to 
inequality in all Arab countries under investigation is about 20%. Two reference scenarios (optimistic 
and pessimistic) were used to project future paths up to 2020 and 2030. The impact of positive growth 
is increasing inequality and a shrinking middle class. Results show that the rich benefit most from this 
growth path. The opposite trend is observed for the pessimistic scenario.  
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1. Introduction 
Issues concerning levels of inequality, changes in inequality and their determinants remain at the heart 
of the development agenda both in theoretical debate and policy discussions. Several factors account 
for this strong interest. First, human development cannot be built on the exploitation of certain groups 
by others or on greater access to resources and power by some groups. Inequitable development is not 
human development, confirms the “Human Development Report, 2010”. Second, empirical studies 
have shown that poverty can be reduced through enhancing growth or reducing inequality or both; 
pro-poor growth strategies are more effective at reducing poverty. Third, several studies have shown 
that reducing inequality – both in the population as a whole and across gender and other groups – can 
improve overall outcomes in health and education, economic growth and vice versa. Fourth, it has 
been increasingly acknowledged worldwide that reducing poverty and inequality means increasing 
people’s access to productive and decent employment. It also means enhancing their human capital by 
increasing social investment in health and education. 
Welfare is a multi-dimensional concept not only concerning material living standards (where these 
can be seen primarily as the outcome of consumption preferences as revealed by the choices people 
make in the market), but also about how non-material goods and services are distributed among 
households. The standard monetary solution of increasing individual income levels ignores the fact 
that some household members are discriminated against and may not be given a proportional share of 
household income. For instance, when children work, a family’s income often rises above the poverty 
level. These children are deprived, yet, according to the traditional income approach, they would not 
be considered as poor. Hence, inequality in income and other dimensions of welfare should be 
addressed.1 
2. Income inequality 
Policy-makers and scholars have usually computed the effectiveness of policy changes on the basis of 
general Lorenz-based inequality criteria. Recent literature, however, stresses the multi-faced aspects of 
income distribution.  
The consumption-based measure is the internationally accepted indicator to measure living standards 
and is based on data collected in the national Household Income, Expenditure and Consumption 
Survey (HIECS). The focus is placed on consumption – rather than income – because it is much easier 
to measure and households are less reluctant to reveal their consumption than their income. Both food 
and non-food items are included, but public services and home-produced services are not. Because 
consumption is only measured at the level of the household rather than the individual, it can only 
provide information on the consumption of the average household member rather than for individuals 
within the household, such as women or children. 
                                                     
* Professor of Statistics, Faculty of Economics and Political Science, Cairo University, hflaithy@gmail.com. 
1 The paper covers the following countries: Israel, Libya, Tunisia, Jordan, Turkey, Algeria, Egypt, Syria and 
Morocco. 
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There are many ways to measure inequality. This study relies mostly on three types of inequality 
measures: i) quantile ratios; ii) Gini coefficients; and iii) Theil inequality measures.  
Quantile ratios are straightforward indicators of inequality that are easy to interpret. The most 
common quantile ratio is the 80/20 ratio, which is the equivalent consumption at the 80th percentile of 
the equivalent consumption distribution divided by the equivalent income at the 20th percentile. 
This measure is easy to interpret. For example, if the 80/20 ratio is equal to 4, then the poorest person 
of the richest 20% of the population consumes 4 times as much as the richest person of the poorest 
20%. Quantile ratios are insensitive to outliers either in the very top or the very bottom tail of the 
consumption distribution. However, quantile ratios do not reflect what happens in other parts of the 
distribution. For example, no change in inequality anywhere between the 21th and the 79th percentile 
would ever be reflected in 80/20 ratio. To address this shortcoming, we also use Gini and Theil 
coefficients. 
The Gini coefficient is defined, graphically, as the area between the Lorenz curve (which graphs the 
cumulative fraction of income versus the cumulative fraction of the population arranged in ascending 
order) and the line of perfect equality. The Gini coefficient is bounded between 0 and 1, with 0 
indicating absolute equality and 1 indicating absolute inequality. The Gini coefficient is especially 
sensitive to changes in inequality in the middle of the equivalent consumption distribution. 
Another widely used class of inequality indicators is the generalised entropy class developed by Theil. 
Within that class, we use Theil mean log deviation index E(0) and  the Theil entropy index E(1). Both 
measures are zero for perfect equality. For complete inequality (one person consumes everything), 
E(0) goes to infinity while E(1) reaches nln(n). The two Theil inequality measures differ in their 
sensitivity to inequality in different parts of the distribution. The entropy measure, E(1), is most 
sensitive to inequality in the top range in the distribution, while the mean log deviation measure, E(0), 
is most sensitive to inequality in the bottom range of the distribution. 
Gini coefficient 
The inequality patterns in countries under investigation show significant variations across countries, 
with countries such as Turkey, Morocco and Tunisia showing relatively high inequality while others, 
such as Egypt or Syria, show moderate to low inequality. Data presented in Table 1 and Figure 1 
broadly confirm this conclusion. The former, which compiles the values of the Gini coefficients for 
eight countries based on various sources, indicates that only a slight change in the distribution of 
expenditure was detected for the majority of countries over the past two decades. 
In addition, with a few exceptions, inequality within countries is generally sluggish over time. This is 
broadly confirmed by the trends based on the most recent data available on expenditure inequality. 
Table 1 reveals that the Gini coefficient ranged from a level of 0.30 in Egypt (2008/09) to 0.4323 in 
Turkey (2005), followed by Morocco (0.4088 in 2007). The country-specific Gini coefficient 
fluctuated within the 1990-2009 period, but always fell between 0.30 and 0.43. Only a slightly change 
in the distribution of expenditure was detected for the majority of the countries under consideration. 
Initial inequality in the countries during the 1990s was also close to the global average. The median 
value of Gini coefficient among the eight countries in the 1990s was 0.39, in line with typical values 
usually provided for the world. In the period 2000-2009, Turkey, Tunisia and Morocco had the highest 
level of inequality, with the Gini coefficient exceeding 0.40. Egypt had the lowest initial equality, with 
a Gini coefficient of around 0.30. Starting from 1990, inequality rose in three countries (Turkey, 
Morocco and Tunisia) and remained unchanged in other countries (Table 1). Jordan experienced the 
largest decline in inequality, with the Gini coefficient falling by 6 percentage points within a 14-year 
span.  
The consumption ratio of the richest quintile and the poorest quintile also tells the same story. 
Inequality is highest in Turkey, Tunisia and Morocco, where population consumption in the richest 
quintile is more than seven times the consumption level of the poorest quintile. Egypt, followed by 
Syria, experienced the lowest inequality level in terms of this ratio. 
Figure 1. 
Source: Au
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increase in the middle class share, except Turkey. Jordan exhibited the biggest change, where the share 
of the middle class had been expanded by 10 percentage points in Jordan, over the 1992-2006 period. 
Growth Incidence Curves 
GIC can explain trends in income distribution and their relation to overall growth. GIC shows the rate 
of change in real consumption at different points in the distribution. The horizontal axis shows the 
expenditure group arranged in percentile increments from poorest to richest. The vertical axis shows 
growth in expenditures, in percent, for the particular expenditure group between two particular dates. 
Kheir-El-Din and El-Laithy (2006) estimated the Egyptian GIC using the 1991, 1995, 1999 and 2004 
household surveys. They noted that the mean real per capita expenditure has been declining over the 
whole period of study, as well as during the first and third sub-periods. It increased only during the 
second sub-period (1995–1999). GIC for the whole period decreases over all quintiles, implying that 
inequality declined, as higher quintiles decline more rapidly than lower quintiles. The annualised 
percentage rise in per capita expenditure is estimated to have exceeded 10% for the poorest two 
percentiles, declined steadily, to reach zero around the 30th percentile and turned negative to reach -2 
% (the average growth of per capita expenditure) around the middle of the eighth decile and continued 
to decline thereafter. This indicates that over the whole period under consideration, expenditure 
distribution has markedly improved, with a clear decline in poverty incidence. However, in the 
subsequent period of 2005-2009, all of GIC curve lies below 0, (see figure 3) suggesting that in terms 
of ability to buy ‘poverty basket’, the purchasing power of the population fell. The curve has an 
inverted U-shape.  It means that the very poor and the very rich were the main losers, but the rich were 
the worst, changes in welfare levels of the middle of the distribution were kept at the average level. 
From the poverty perspective the distribution has deteriorated sharply with losses for the poorest 
among the poor (those who already was barely meeting their basic needs).  
El-Laithy and Abu-Ismail (2005) have shown that income distribution in Syria increased between 
1996 and 2004. This increase can be explained by noting that growth rates at the national level were 
not fairly distributed among the population. For instance, the lower percentiles of the expenditure 
distribution grew at a lower annual rate than the average rate, indicating that growth was accompanied 
by a rise in expenditure inequality. However, the period of 2004-2007 saw a trend in the opposite 
direction, where GIC shows that on average real per capita expenditure declined over the period 2004-
2007, the bottom percentiles experienced gains in their welfare and the richest percentiles experienced 
large losses, which were particularly pronounced at the top decile; see Figure 3.  
 
Figure 3. Growth Incidence Curve for 2004/5-2008/9 
Egypt 
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3. Break-down of inequality 
There are major socio-economic indicators directly correlated to welfare. These indicators reflect the 
income earning and survival opportunities of individuals. Typically, these relate to the socio-
demographic characteristics, such as age and household composition, educational attainment and 
employment status. The distribution of welfare in any society depends on differences in characteristics 
of its population (e.g. illiteracy rate, % of skilled labour) and on their earning capacity.  
Inequality can be broken down into two dimensions. One can decompose total inequality in income 
into the contribution of each income source in overall inequality. This decomposition can be 
performed using the Gini coefficient. The second way of decomposing inequality is to view it in terms 
of inequality within population subgroups and between subgroups. This decomposition can be 
performed using the Theil indices.  
Decomposition by population group allows us to look more closely at the causes of inequality. 
Following Bourguignon (2007) and Shorrocks (1982), we decompose total inequality into a 
component that is due to inequality across population subgroups, and into a component that is due to 
inequality within these subgroups.  
As the effort levels are expected to vary within each group, the within-groups component of overall 
inequality could be deemed as the natural outcome of individuals’ efforts variability, and thus, it is the 
result of individuals’ responsibility; which is beyond the scope of justice. On the other hand, between- 
groups inequality reflects only the variability of circumstances across individuals, thus we can use it as 
an estimate of the inequality of opportunities. Therefore, inequality of opportunity is beyond the 
individuals’ responsibility, and should be reduced, through appropriate social and economic 
development policies.  
Location, educational attainment and employment status have been identified as the most important 
factors affecting welfare level and its distribution. First, regions differ not only in their natural 
resources, but also in the provision of public services. Second, education is a key determinant of 
command over resources. Education determines the command of individuals over income-earning 
opportunities through access to various types of employment. Education was typically found to have a 
high explanatory power on observed patterns of income distribution. The correlation between 
education and welfare has important implications for policy, particularly for the distributional impact. 
Third, changes in employment structure and its productivity can influence both determinants of change 
in income and its distribution. Growth in employment and its productivity can improve the growth rate 
of the economy. Moreover, changes in employment structure and its productivity can improve income 
distribution by pushing up the relevant segment of the Lorenz distribution. This can come about only 
by increasing employment and its remuneration.  
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Based on direct access to micro-data for Egypt, Syria and Lebanon, we decompose overall expenditure 
inequality into inequality between and within subgroups. We investigated inequality by location, 
education attainment and employment status for different years. 
Tables 2 to 10 report the results of our decomposition exercise for Egypt, Syria and Lebanon. In 
Egypt, we first take the country as a whole and ask how much of the overall inequality is attributable 
to the between-group component in a series of settings. Decline in overall Theil inequality index E(0) 
from 0.171 to 0.157 is mainly due to a decline in inequality in urban areas (by 1.4 percentage points) 
We observe that if one breaks Egypt down into an urban and rural sector, only 20% of overall 
inequality can be attributed to the difference in average consumption between these two areas, in 
2008. Most inequality would remain if this difference in averages were removed. The conclusion 
holds, irrespective of the inequality measure being used. A slight reduction has been observed in the 
contribution of inequality measures due to urban/rural differences, indicating smaller differences 
between urban and rural areas in 2008 compared to 2004 (from 20.4% to 20.05%). The stagnant of 
inequality between urban and rural areas raises concerns about the rural development process and calls 
for further investigations in order to infer their determinants. 
If Egypt were broken down into the seven regions (Metropolitan, Urban Lower, Rural Lower, Urban 
Upper, Rural Upper, Urban Border, Rural Border), disparities due to differences between regions 
averages; between regions component; reaches 27.5% in 2008-09. The decomposition of inequality 
suggests that the reduction in inequality would be lower – around 27.5%, if differences in average 
consumption across all regions were removed. However, data show that differences between regions 
have been widened during the period 2004-05 to 2008-09, as the contribution of between regions 
differences in overall inequality has increased from 26.5% to 27.5%. 
In Syria, where overall inequality is much higher than in Egypt, between-urban and rural disparities 
contributed a much lower share, (7.4% in 2003-04 and 4.9% in 2006-07). Within-urban/rural 
inequality had increased, where its contribution to overall inequality increased from 92.6% to 94.6%. 
Moreover, reduction in inequality is mainly due to decline in urban inequality, where the Theil index 
declined from 23.6% to 17.7%.  
The Theil index is decomposed through education levels, within- and between-subgroups; inequality is 
computed for Egypt, Syria and Lebanon. In all countries, the within-group component is always the 
most important. Between-education levels component – reflecting disparities between education levels 
– is the highest in Egypt; constituting 16% of overall index of overall index. The within-education 
group contribution to overall inequality, on the other hand, appears naturally the most important and 
displays little trend mainly over the period 2004-05 to 2008-09. The impact of education level in Syria 
on inequality is less important, as the share of between groups component in overall inequality reached 
9.5-% in 2006-07. For both Egypt and Syria, inequality in each educational category had declined 
except for individuals with a qualification higher than a university degree. Moreover, in both 
countries, inequality increases as we move from a lower to higher level of education. In Lebanon, as in 
the other two countries, disparities between education level averages explain only 10.4% of overall 
inequality, but there is no clear relationship between educational level and inequality. 
Decomposition of the Theil index by employment status shows that most of the observed inequality in 
all countries and in all years is ‘within’ (as opposed to ‘between’) groups. In Egypt, there was a slight 
decline in inequality ‘between’ employment groups. There was also a slight increase in within-group 
inequality for both Egypt and Syria. Variation within wage workers and employer categories is much 
higher compared to other employment categories. These were categories that witnessed the largest 
decreases in inequality. 
Social expenditure, human capital and inequality 
Public expenditure on infrastructure, health and education are usually expected to improve equality in 
opportunities, total factor productivity, and growth. In the countries under consideration, high 
expenditure on social services such as education, health and other infrastructure has always been seen 
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as a major re-distributional mechanism. In turn, these mechanisms have helped to achieve large gains 
in terms of access to these services and poverty reduction. 
Van de Walle (2004) considers the geographical aspects of poverty and social outcomes in relation to 
the impact of public spending programmes in Morocco. She finds that social programmes are well 
targeted toward the rural poor, who obtain substantial benefits, but not to the urban poor. 
The more common approach to assess the impact of social expenditures on inequality in developing 
countries is the so-called benefit incidence analysis. It shows distribution of social spending across the 
household expenditure ladder. In Egypt, a 2008/09 benefit incidence analysis was performed to 
investigate benefits of different deciles of per capita expenditure from educational subsidies. The 
distribution of children by decile of per capita expenditure was compared with the distribution of 
direct beneficiary students from public schools and thus the proportion of total public funding of 
education going to each decile of the Egyptian population was estimated. Table 11 shows the 
results of this analysis, and Figure 4 illustrates them graphically in the form of a cumulative 
distribution curve, the benefit incidence curve.  
In the benefit incidence curve, the horizontal axis represents the cumulative percentage of the 
population from the poorest to the left to the richest to the right. The vertical axis is the 
cumulative distribution of those who actually benefited from public education spending. The 45-
degree line from bottom left to top right is a benchmark for equal access to public spending on 
education across the entire vulnerability score distribution. Thus the benefit incidence curve plots 
the percentile of all the children below that level against the percentile of the public spending 
beneficiaries below it. When the benefit incidence curve lies above the 45° line, it shows that (for 
example, when the 20th percentile of public spending beneficiaries falls within the 10th percentile 
of all children), public spending on education was being allocated progressively, targeting the 
relatively poor. Whereas when the benefit incidence curve lies below the 45° line, it indicates that 
public spending on education is being allocated regressively, targeting the (relatively) less 
vulnerable. 
Table 11 and Figure 4 show that public spending on basic education is almost neutral where all deciles 
get almost equal shares. The poorest 10% of households gained 9.5% of the total public basic 
education subsidies, and the richest 10% gained 9.5%. One should argue that benefits should be well 
targeted to the vulnerable so that children in the lower deciles should receive more benefits. This is 
quite apparent from Figure 4, where the benefit incidence curve is identical to the neutral curve (45° 
line). 
Figure 4. Benefit incidence curves in public schools3 
 a) Basic education b) Secondary education c) Higher education 
   
                                                     
3 The benefit incidence curve describes the percentage shares of benefits in relation to population shares. If 
benefits are equitably distributed, the share of benefits for any population group equals its population share. 
When benefit incidence curve is higher than the 45 degree line, poorer population groups receive higher benefits 
share than its population share.  
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However, the degree of equity in the benefit-incidence analysis differs by level of education. While 
public spending on basic education favours the poor, spending on secondary public schools and 
universities is heavily tilted toward the rich. Incidence curves for both secondary and higher education 
are below the neutral curve (45° line), especially for higher education, indicating that public spending 
for these stages is progressive where the rich obtain more benefits. The poorest decile benefited with 
6% as opposed to the richest decile, which gained 12% and 20% for secondary and higher education, 
respectively.  
Figure 5 illustrates the progressive nature of public health services more obviously. Benefit incidence 
curves of all types of government institutions are above the neutral line, indicating that the poor 
receive more benefits than the better off. It seems that self-targeting mechanisms work well in health 
subsidies; the poor choose this kind of cheap or free health care as they have no other alternative. On 
the other hand, the better off were kicked out as a result of low quality of health services provided by 
government institutions. In fact, households have to consider the trade-off between the cost of medical 
services and the quality of services they obtain. 
Figure 5. Benefit incidence curve for public health expenditure 
 a) Government Hospitals b) Government Health Units c) Any Government Institution 
   
Source: Author’s calculations. 
 
4. Inequality in Human Development 
The Global Human Development Report 2010 rightly stated that: 
“Human development cannot be built on exploitation of some groups by others or on greater 
access to resources and power by some groups. Inequitable development is not human 
development. Equity and the HDI are systematically related: countries that do well on the 
HDI tend to be more equitable. This result is consistent with research that shows how 
reducing inequality – both in the population as a whole and across gender and other groups – 
can improve overall outcomes in health and education, as well as economic growth”. 
Adjusting the Human Development Index for inequality 
HDR 2010 introduces the inequality-adjusted HDI (IHDI), a measure of the level of human 
development of people in a society that accounts for inequality. The IHDI takes into account not only 
a country’s average human development, as measured by health, education and income indicators, but 
also how it is distributed. We can think of each individual in a society as having a ‘personal HDI.’ If 
everyone had the same life expectancy, schooling and income, and hence the average societal level of 
each variable, the HDI for this society would be the same as each personal HDI level and hence the 
HDI of the ‘average person.’ In practice, of course, there are differences among people, and the 
average HDI differs from personal HDI levels. The IHDI accounts for inequalities in life expectancy, 
schooling and income, by ‘discounting’ each dimension’s average value according to its level of 
inequality. The IHDI will be equal to the HDI when there is no inequality across people, but falls 
further below the HDI as inequality rises. In this sense, the HDI can be viewed as an index of 
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These findings show the value of a truly multidimensional measure of inequality and point to potential 
policies. Dispersion in health and education is a major challenge for policy-makers. 
For health, programmes are needed to reduce the gap in access to public services, such as vaccination 
programmes, between the rich and the poor. And, as most schooling is publicly provided, greater 
efforts are needed to promote equitable access to education services. 
Measuring gender inequality – the Gender Inequality Index 
The disadvantages facing women and girls are a major source of inequality. Measures of the 
disadvantages for women raise awareness of problems, permit monitoring of progress towards gender 
equity objectives and keep governments accountable.  
Gender inequality index (GII) introduced by the global HDR2010, includes educational attainment, 
economic and political participation and female-specific health issues and in accounting for 
overlapping inequalities at the national level. A full set of GII estimates for all countries for which 
data are available is in Table 13. 
The GII increases when disadvantages across dimensions are associated – that is, the more correlated 
the disparities between genders across dimensions, the higher the index. This takes account of the fact 
that the dimensions are complementary and that inequality in schooling tends to be correlated with, 
say, access to work opportunities and maternal mortality. Overlapping disadvantages are an important 
aspect of gender inequality, and capturing them is a major advantage of the GII. The method also 
ensures that low achievement in one dimension cannot be totally compensated for by high 
achievement in another. 
The risk of death in childbirth is reduced through basic education, adequate nutrition, and access to 
contraceptives, antenatal health services and skilled attendants at birth. However, such services are 
still denied to too many women, even though many are inexpensive. 
Among the countries under investigation, the Gender Inequality Index ranges from 0.332 to 0.714 
(reflecting percentage losses in achievement of 33 % to 71 %).The  Gender Inequality Index is the 
highest in Egypt 0.714, indicating that the gap between men and women in Egypt is the largest in all 
human development dimensions. Egypt is followed by Morocco and Syria. Egypt lost 7 positions 
because of gender inequality. On the other hand, and according to data in the global HDR 2010, Libya 
has the least gender inequality index among all Arab countries under investigation, at 0.504. 
The correlation is strong (0.93) between gender inequality and the loss due to inequality in the 
distribution of the HDI. This suggests that countries with an unequal distribution of human 
development also experience high inequality between women and men and that countries with high 
gender inequality also have an unequal distribution of human development. Among the countries 
doing badly on both fronts are Morocco and Egypt, each with losses of more than 40% (inequality) 
and 70% (gender). 
Countries exhibit enormous variations in maternal mortality ratios, even countries at similar human 
development levels. Algeria and Tunisia have a similar HDI to that of Jordon and Turkey, but 
Algeria’s maternal mortality ratio is more than three times that of Jordon. Morocco has the highest 
maternal mortality ratios (280 deaths for 100,000 live births), followed by Algeria and Lebanon. 
Women have traditionally been disadvantaged in the political arena at all levels of government. To 
capture this disadvantage, the Gender Inequality Index (GII) uses the ratio of female to male 
representatives in parliament. National parliamentary representation, which reflects women’s visibility 
in political leadership and in society more generally, has been increasing over time, even though the 
global average is still only 16%. In 2008 Tunisia’s parliament became the first to have a majority of 
women; 19.9 % of all parliamentary seats are held by women, and Egypt has the least representation 
of women, at 3.7%. Women’s representation in parliament is less than 10% in seven out of ten 
countries.   
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Tables 
Table 1. Income inequality measures 
Year of Survey Gini (expenditure) Ratio richest / poorest quintile % of middle class 
Algeria 1988 40.1 7.21 73.86 
  1995 35.3 6.12 74.42 
Egypt 1990 32 4.71 71.21 
  1995 30.1 4.2 72.74 
  1999 32.8 4.7 79.33 
  2004 32.1 4.6 80.24 
  2008 33 
Jordan 1986 36 6.01 87.38 
  1992 43.4 8.44 78.89 
  1997 36.4 5.92 84.77 
  2002 38.9 6.92 82.62 
  2006 37.7 6.29 88.15 
Lebanon 2004 36 6.14 
Morocco 1984 39.2 6.87 69.7 
  1990 39.2 7.03 78.87 
  1998 39.5 7.22 72.28 
  2000 40.6 7.48 71.97 
  2007 40.9 7.34 81.31 
Syria 1997 33.7 5.32 
  2004 37.4 5.67 
  2007 34 
Tunisia 1985 43.4 9.28 70.6 
  1990 40.2 7.85 76.93 
  1995 41.7 8.5 74.12 
  2000 40.8 7.98 79.75 
  2005 41.3 8.13 
Turkey 1987 43.57 8.47 83.84 
  1994 41.53 8.22 81.17 
  2002 42.71 8.65 80.69 
  2005 43.23 9.42 78.64 
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Table 2. Inequality decomposition by educational attainment: Egypt 
  2008-09 2004-05 
Group 
Entropy 
index 
Population 
Share 
Relative 
contribution 
Entropy 
index 
Population 
Share 
Relative 
contribution 
Illiterate 0.112 0.217 0.155 0.112 0.224 0.146 
Literate (no 
diploma) 0.124 0.125 0.099 0.138 0.130 0.105 
Primary/ 
preparatory 0.132 0.160 0.135 0.151 0.158 0.139 
Secondary 0.141 0.189 0.170 0.150 0.181 0.159 
Above 
secondary 0.138 0.021 0.019 0.154 0.021 0.019 
University 0.224 0.068 0.098 0.245 0.067 0.096 
Above 
university 0.267 0.002 0.003 0.257 0.002 0.003 
Within 0.679 0.668 
Between 0.160 0.171 
Population 0.157 1 1 0.171 1 1 
Table 3. Inequality decomposition by employment status: Egypt 
  2008-09 2004-05 
Group 
Entropy 
index 
Population 
Share 
Relative 
contribution 
Entropy 
index 
Population 
Share 
Relative 
contribution 
Wage-earner 0.168 0.199 0.213 0.191 0.196 0.219 
Employer 0.176 0.049 0.055 0.187 0.054 0.059 
Self-employed  0.110 0.056 0.039 0.115 0.066 0.045 
Unpaid 
worker 0.072 0.057 0.026 0.079 0.054 0.025 
Unemployed 0.138 0.018 0.016 0.154 0.021 0.019 
Out of 
labour force 0.162 0.445 0.460 0.177 0.440 0.454 
Not working 
age 0.153 0.176 0.172 0.157 0.169 0.155 
Within 0.981 0.975 
Between 0.019 0.025 
Population 0.157 1 1 0.171 1 1 
Table 4. Inequality decomposition by location: Egypt 
  2008-09 2004-05 
Group 
Entropy 
index 
Population 
Share 
Relative 
contribution 
Entropy 
index 
Population 
Share 
Relative 
contribution 
Urban 0.185 0.411 0.486 0.199 0.434 0.503 
Rural 0.083 0.589 0.314 0.089 0.566 0.293 
Within --- --- 0.799 --- --- 0.796 
Between --- --- 0.201 --- --- 0.204 
Population 0.157 1 1 0.171 1 1 
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Table 5. Inequality decomposition by region: Egypt 
  2008-09 2004-05 
Group 
Entropy 
index 
Population 
Share 
Relative 
contribution 
Entropy 
index 
Population 
Share 
Relative 
contribution 
Metropolitan  0.202 0.170 0.220 0.212 0.187 0.231 
Lower Urban 0.114 0.115 0.084 0.120 0.121 0.085 
lower Rural 0.066 0.318 0.134 0.071 0.307 0.128 
Upper Urban 0.178 0.115 0.131 0.203 0.119 0.140 
Upper Rural 0.085 0.266 0.144 0.094 0.254 0.139 
Borders Urban 0.153 0.010 0.010 0.083 0.007 0.003 
borders Rural 0.086 0.005 0.003 0.214 0.005 0.007 
Within 0.725 0.735 
Between 0.275 0.265 
Population 0.157 1 1 0.171 1 1 
Table 6. Inequality decomposition by educational attainment: Syria 
  2006-07 2003-04 
Group 
Entropy 
index 
Population 
Share 
Relative 
contribution 
Entropy 
index 
Population 
Share 
Relative 
contribution 
Illiterate 0.187 0.076 0.074 0.205 0.176 0.158 
Literate without 
diploma 0.189 0.156 0.154 0.201 0.245 0.214 
Primary 0.164 0.279 0.239 0.202 0.351 0.308 
preparatory 0.183 0.115 0.110 0.228 0.105 0.105 
secondary 0.184 0.072 0.069 0.217 0.066 0.062 
above secondary 0.184 0.029 0.028 0.229 0.031 0.031 
university 0.196 0.025 0.026 0.290 0.027 0.034 
post graduate 0.321 0.002 0.003 
unspecified 0.173 0.003 0.002 0.100 0.000 0.000 
Within 0.704 0.912 
Between 0.095 0.088 
Population 0.192 1 1 0.229 1 1 
Table 7. Inequality decomposition by educational attainment: Syria 
  2006-07 2003-04 
Group 
Entropy 
index 
Population 
Share 
Relative 
contribution 
Entropy 
index 
Population 
Share 
Relative 
contribution 
Wage-earner 0.189 0.154 0.152 0.230 0.154 0.154 
Employer 0.255 0.019 0.025 0.275 0.020 0.024 
Self-employed  0.179 0.072 0.067 0.223 0.071 0.069 
Unpaid worker 0.176 0.033 0.030 0.184 0.039 0.031 
Unemployed 0.208 0.012 0.013 0.189 0.027 0.022 
Out of labour force 0.195 0.464 0.472 0.239 0.439 0.457 
Within --- --- 0.760 --- --- 0.757 
Between --- --- 0.033 --- --- 0.027 
Population 0.192 1 1 0.229 1 1 
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Table 8. Inequality decomposition by location: Syria 
  2006-07 2003-04 
Group 
Entropy 
index 
Population 
Share 
Relative 
contribution 
Entropy 
index 
Population 
Share 
Relative 
contribution 
Urban 0.177 0.541 0.499 0.236 0.508 0.522 
Rural 0.187 0.459 0.447 0.188 0.492 0.404 
Within --- --- 0.946 --- --- 0.926 
Between --- --- 0.049 --- --- 0.074 
Population 0.192 1 1 0.229 1 1 
Table 9. Inequality decomposition by educational attainment: Lebanon 
  2004-05 
Group Entropy index Population Share Relative contribution 
Illiterate 0.186 0.079 0.062 
Literate without diploma 0.206 0.045 0.039 
Primary 0.187 0.185 0.147 
Intermediate 0.179 0.140 0.107 
Secondary 0.186 0.092 0.073 
University 0.219 0.070 0.066 
Within --- --- 0.494 
Between --- --- 0.104 
Population 0.235 1 1 
Table 10. Inequality decomposition by employment status: Lebanon 
  2004-05 
Group Entropy index Population Share Relative contribution 
Wage-earner 0.254 0.184 0.199 
Self-employer 0.234 0.014 0.014 
Self-employed  0.209 0.085 0.076 
Unpaid worker 0.223 0.008 0.008 
Unemployed 0.208 0.025 0.022 
Out of labour force 0.247 0.015 0.016 
Within --- --- 0.335 
Between --- --- 0.026 
Population 0.235 1 1 
Table 11. Distribution of Egypt’s public spending on education by deciles, 2008 
Per capita expenditure Deciles Basic Education Secondary Education Tertiary 
10 9.58 5.87 5.84 
20 19.49 12.41 10.45 
30 29.53 23.90 15.51 
40 39.76 34.86 20.12 
50 49.85 44.83 25.78 
60 59.99 55.15 33.47 
70 70.47 62.62 45.76 
80 81.08 75.05 64.05 
90 90.50 88.10 80.92 
100 100 100 100 
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Table 12. Inequality-adjusted human development index 
 
Human 
Developm
ent Index 
(HDI) 
Inequality-adjusted HDI 
Inequality-
adjusted life 
expectancy at 
birth index 
Inequality-
adjusted 
education 
index 
Inequality-
adjusted 
income index 
Income 
Gini 
coeffici-
ent 
Value Value 
Overall loss 
(%) 
Change in 
rank Value 
Loss 
(%) Value
Loss 
(%) Value 
Loss 
(%) 
2000-20102010 2010 2010 2010 2010 2010 2010 2010 2010 2010 
Israel 0.872 0.763 12.5 -11 0.922 4.8 0.799 7.9 0.603 23.7 39.2 
Libya 0.755 .. .. .. 0.759 12.1 .. .. .. .. .. 
Tunisia 0.683 0.511 25.2 -6 0.751 12.7 0.378 38.7 0.469 21.8 40.8 
Jordan 0.681 0.550 19.2 7 0.729 13.3 0.508 25.1 0.450 18.7 37.7 
Turkey 0.679 0.518 23.6 1 0.690 16.5 0.405 27.4 0.498 26.5 41.2 
Algeria 0.677 .. .. .. 0.688 17.9 .. .. .. .. 35.3 
Egypt 0.620 0.449 27.5 -7 0.641 19.8 0.304 43.6 0.465 15.9 32.1 
Syria 0.589 0.467 20.8 4 0.769 11.1 0.312 31.5 0.424 18.3 .. 
Morocco 0.567 0.407 28.1 2 0.670 18.3 0.246 42.7 0.409 20.7 40.9 
Table 13. Gender inequality index 
Country 
GII 
Maternal 
mortality 
ratio 
Adolescent 
fertility rate 
Seats in 
parliament
(%) 
Population with 
at least 
secondary 
education 
(% ages 25 and 
older) 
Labour force 
participation 
rate 
(%) 
Female  Female Male Female Male 
2008 2003–2008 1990–2008 2008 2010 2010 2008 2008 
Israel 0.332 4 14.3 14.2 78.9 77.2 61.1 70.1 
Libya 0.504 97 3.2 7.7 55.6 44.0 25.1 81.1 
Tunisia 0.515 100 6.9 19.9 33.5 48.0 27.7 74.2 
Jordan 0.616 62 24.5 8.5 57.6 73.8 24.7 78.3 
Turkey 0.621 44 38.8 9.1 27.1 46.8 26.9 74.6 
Algeria 0.594 180 7.3 6.5 36.3 49.3 38.2 83.1 
Egypt 0.714 130 39.0 3.7 43.4 61.1 24.4 76.4 
Syria 0.687 130 61.1 12.4 24.7 24.1 22.0 82.1 
Morocco 0.693 240 18.9 6.2 20.1 36.4 28.7 83.6 
Lebanon .. 150 16.2 4.7 .. .. 24.1 74.8 
 Palestine .. .. 78.7 .. .. .. 16.7 72.4 
Table 14. Inequality measures for base year 
  Gini Coefficient ratio of richest /poorest quintile % of middle class 
Algeria 35.33 6.12 74.42 
Egypt 32.14 4.6 80.24 
Jordan 37.72 6.29 88.15 
Morocco 40.88 7.34 81.31 
Syria 35.78 5.92 84.77 
Tunisia 40.81 7.98 79.75 
Turkey 43.23 9.42 78.64 
Overall 37.76 6.87 79.74 
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Table 15. Projected inequality measures for 2020 
  Optimistic reference scenario Pessimistic  reference scenario 
  
Growth 
per 
annum Gini 
ratio of richest 
/poorest 
quintile 
% of 
middle 
class 
Growth 
per 
annum Gini 
ratio of richest 
/poorest quintile 
% of 
middle 
class 
Algeria .02 38.883 7.433 67.374 -0.02 32.478 5.066 80.075 
Egypt .02 35.589 5.161 72.643 -0.02 29.372 4.149 86.337 
Jordan .02 41.514 7.639 79.804 -0.02 34.675 5.207 94.848 
Morocco .02 44.991 8.915 73.612 -0.02 37.580 6.076 87.489 
Syria .02 39.378 7.190 76.744 -0.02 32.892 4.901 91.211 
Tunisia .02 39.037 7.081 72.199 -0.02 42.233 8.702 85.810 
Turkey .02 45.340 11.383 71.194 -0.02 41.536 7.844 84.616 
Overall  40.713 8.094 72.191  35.397 5.892 85.800 
Table 16. Projected inequality measures for 2020 and 2030: Optimistic scenario 
  2020 2030 
Country 
%Change 
from 
optimistic 
reference 
scenario Gini 
ratio of richest 
/poorest 
quintile 
% of 
middle 
class 
%Change 
from 
optimistic 
reference 
scenario Gini 
ratio of 
richest 
/poorest 
quintile 
% of 
middle 
class 
Algeria -0.24 38.030 7.118 69.065 -0.23 40.899 8.178 63.377 
Egypt -0.06 35.382 5.128 73.099 -0.12 38.317 5.606 66.632 
Jordan -0.08 41.210 7.531 80.472 -0.13 44.438 8.679 73.371 
Morocco -0.16 44.334 8.663 74.843 -0.31 46.654 9.551 70.498 
Syria -0.04 39.234 7.139 77.065 -0.07 42.592 8.324 69.577 
Tunisia 0.28 38.540 6.829 70.085 0.19 36.515 5.802 61.461 
Turkey 1.21 47.894 13.759 62.185 1.03 51.950 17.532 47.876 
Overall  41.202 8.719 69.909  44.234 10.331 61.237 
Table 17. Projected inequality measures for 2020 and 2030: Pessimistic scenario 
  2020 2030 
  
%Change 
from 
Pessimistic 
reference 
scenario Gini 
ratio of richest 
/poorest 
quintile 
% of 
middle 
class 
%Change 
from 
Pessimistic 
reference 
scenario Gini 
ratio of 
richest 
/poorest 
quintile 
% of 
middle 
class 
Algeria -0.24 33.163 5.319 78.718 -0.23 31.670 4.768 81.678 
Egypt -0.06 29.538 4.176 85.971 -0.12 28.080 3.939 89.183 
Jordan -0.08 34.919 5.294 94.312 -0.13 33.305 4.720 97.863 
Morocco -0.16 38.108 6.278 86.500 -0.31 37.085 5.887 88.416 
Syria -0.04 33.008 4.942 90.954 -0.07 31.303 4.340 94.755 
Tunisia 0.28 42.632 8.904 87.507 0.19 43.633 9.411 91.770 
Turkey 1.21 39.487 5.938 91.846 1.03 37.499 4.088 98.859 
Overall  35.005 5.391 87.631  33.512 4.600 91.902 
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